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Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and 
Barriers to Entry  
Joanna M. Shepherd† 
Abstract 
Biologic drugs represent an important new category of drugs in 
the effort to improve health outcomes in this country. Yet, these 
cutting-edge drugs are often cost prohibitive, preventing access for 
many Americans. Recognizing the need for more affordable, generic 
substitutes for biologic drugs—or biosimilars—Congress recently 
created a biosimilars approval pathway that would enable these 
cheaper biologic drugs to obtain FDA approval and reach patients 
more quickly. Unfortunately, original biologics manufacturers have 
sought to extend their current monopoly profits by erecting various 
legal and regulatory barriers to entry. Their legal maneuvers take 
many forms, from delaying approval of safe biosimilars to abrogating 
previous commitments to international drug-naming protocols, and 
even circumventing Congressional intent for biosimilar substitution. 
Regrettably, these policies reduce competition in the market for 
biologic drugs, impede drug innovation, increase drug costs, and limit 
patient access to these important medications. This article explores 
the conflict between biologics and biosimilars, and the consequences 
that barriers to biosimilar entry in this market will create. 
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Introduction 
Medications comprise a significant share of both America’s 
economy in general, and its health care sector in specific. With annual 
spending over $320 billion,1 prescription drugs consume over 10 
percent of all American medical spending.2 Spending on a relatively 
new category of medications, biological drugs—or biologics—is 
growing rapidly. In 2013, biologics comprised a quarter of drug 
spending,3 rising to potentially two-thirds of drug spending by 2015.4 
These cutting-edge drugs offer patients with complicated and 
otherwise fatal diseases hope for remission or even an outright cure. 
Yet they are often prohibitively expensive, with courses of treatment 
for diseases from rheumatoid arthritis to breast cancer to multiple 
sclerosis running tens to even hundreds of thousands of dollars per 
patient.5 As a result, many patients do not have access to these life-
saving treatments. 
Fortunately, Congress has recognized the need for cheaper, 
generic substitutes for biologic drugs—or biosimilars. As part of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), Congress created a biosimilars approval 
pathway that would enable these cheaper biologic drugs to obtain 
FDA approval and reach patients more quickly. Consumers stand to 
benefit significantly from the new market competition between lower-
 
1. FTC, Public Workshop: Follow-On Biologics: Impact of Recent 
Legislative and Regulatory Naming Proposals on Competition, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 68840, 68841 (Nov. 15, 2013). 
2. See, e.g., Nation’s Health Dollar ($2.7 Trillion), Calendar Year 2011: 
Where it Went, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/PieChartSourcesExpen
ditures2011.pdf. 
3. Andrew Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit 
Generics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-in-states-on-
generic-copies-of-biotech-drugs.html?_r=0. 
4. Steve Miller, The $250 Billion Potential of Biosimilars, EXPRESS 
SCRIPTS LAB (Apr. 23, 2013), http://lab.express-scripts.com/speciality-
medications/the-250-billion-potential-of-
biosimilars/#sthash.EVnF5tSn.dpuf. 
5. See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA 
REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 2 (2010) [hereinafter CRS FDA 
REPORT]. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to Entry 
141 
cost, but similarly effective, biosimilars; in fact, estimates suggest this 
competition could save consumers $250 billion over the next decade.6 
Unfortunately, as with traditional brand-name pharmaceuticals 
and generics, original biologics manufacturers have sought to extend 
their monopoly profits by erecting legal and regulatory barriers to 
entry and use. These companies broadly resist the availability of 
biosimilars and have successfully lobbied both the FDA and state 
legislatures to obstruct the biosimilars approval pathway.7 The legal 
maneuvers employed by pharmaceutical and biologics manufacturers 
take many forms, from delaying approval of safe biosimilars to 
abrogating previous commitments to international drug-naming 
protocols to circumventing Congressional intent for biosimilar 
substitution. These policies reduce competition in the market for 
biologic drugs, impede drug innovation, increase drug costs, and limit 
patient access to these important medications, thus frustrating the 
ACA’s goals of increasing healthcare availability while controlling 
healthcare costs. 
This analysis examines in detail the conflict between biologic drug 
exclusivity and patient access to biologically similar drugs, or 
biosimilars. Like traditional prescription drugs, potential biologics 
require large up-front research and development costs; these costs 
attend equally large product failure rates. Federal law accordingly 
provides biologic manufacturers with a lengthy exclusivity period to 
recoup these costs. But while a statutory exclusivity period prompts 
original manufacturers to further innovation, it comes at the expense 
of increased prices and reduced access to potent biologics.  
Legislators and regulators must strike a careful balance between 
permitting certain companies to earn monopoly profits and allowing 
free competition and broad drug availability to patients. Lessons from 
economic principles, sound empirical analysis, and other countries’ 
experiences suggest that impeding biosimilars’ entry to market will 
harm consumers and patients with little to no corresponding benefits 
except to pharmaceutical monopolists. 
This analysis begins by exploring the background, history, and 
substantial benefits behind biologics and close substitutes to biologics, 
with reference to the historically familiar conflict between traditional 
name-brand and generic prescription drugs. The analysis then turns 
to several proposed regulatory and legislative roadblocks on an 
already-enacted federal pathway for expedited approval of safe, 
 
6. Steve Miller, Senior Vice President & Chief Medical Officer of Express 
Scripts, Customer Perspective on Biosimilars, 7, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-
On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/miller.pdf. 
7. See Pollack, supra note 3. 
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biologically similar substitutes for known biologics. These roadblocks 
include recent actions by the FDA and bills enacted and proposed 
before multiple state legislatures. It discusses why these proposals, 
instead of promoting consumer safety as some advocates insist, will 
raise prices and decrease patient access to potent biologics, ultimately 
denying consumers top-quality medical care at more affordable prices. 
These barriers to entry not only contravene the spirit of the ACA, 
which provided speedier certification for substitute biologics, but also 
increase costs and reduce competition, all for no established benefits 
to patient safety or manufacturer innovation. I conclude that further 
attempts to increase or protect exclusivity for biologics will help only 
a few drug companies at the cost of healthcare markets, patient care, 
and the American economy at large. 
I. Complex Medicine: A History of Biologics and 
Consumer Benefits 
Biologics both gather their name and primarily distinguish 
themselves from traditional drugs by their origins. They are derived 
from living organisms, typically proteins, though occasionally 
including toxins, blood, viruses, or allergens.8 These medications 
include many novel and powerful tools, and are far more complex 
than traditional medicines. Where a traditional drug might contain 
between a few dozen to a hundred atoms per molecule, the 
complicated proteins of a biologic can include from several thousand 
to tens of thousands of atoms per molecule.9 Biologics are 
comparatively new relative to traditional drugs: The FDA only 
cleared the first biologic for human use, human insulin, in 1982.10  
Drug manufacturers and regulators alike recognize that the 
inherent complexity of biologics introduces concerns not present with 
their traditional counterparts—biologics cannot be perfectly 
duplicated. Manufacturers can perfectly duplicate traditional drugs, 
potentially guaranteeing the “absence of a significant difference” 
between an FDA-approved drug and a proposed equivalent.11 This 
effective duplication, or bioequivalence, defines the conventional 
 
8. Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing 
Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(I) 
(2006)). 
9. See, e.g., Joan Kerber-Walker, Small Molecules, Large Biologics, and 
the Biosimilar Debate, ARIZ. BIOINDUSTRY ASS’N (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.azbio.org/small-molecules-large-biologics-and-the-biosimilar-
debate. 
10. CRS FDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. 
11. 21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2010). See also Henry Grabowski et al., 
Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic & Policy Issues, 
41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 512 n.5 (2011). 
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relationship between a “brand-name” drug and a “generic” drug; 
generic drugs, simply put, are bioequivalent substitutes for brand-
name counterparts. However, whereas bioequivalence is possible for a 
chemically-synthesized drug with dozens or hundreds of atoms, it is 
impossible to duplicate exactly complex biologics with tens of 
thousands of atoms per molecule; even a chemically identical biologic 
may produce different effects in the body because of the unique 
structural organization pattern of the proteins (known as “folding”).12 
In fact, biologics even vary slightly across batches from a single, 
original manufacturer.13 As a result, companies looking to replicate a 
biologic must instead use highly similar, but slightly variant, living 
organisms or processes in creating a biosimilar (sometimes called a 
“follow-on biologic,” or FOB), a substitute biologic copied from an 
original biologic and designed to act as a “generic biologic.”14 
The benefits of cheaper, more widely available generic drugs were 
recognized in the market for traditional drugs three decades ago. As 
FDA drug approvals proved notoriously slow and expensive, Congress 
recognized the duplicative costs inherent in requiring bioequivalent 
drugs to undergo the full procedural rigors behind FDA approval. 
This prompted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.15 Hatch-Waxman 
crafted a framework designed to both preserve incentives for “brand-
name” innovations as well as to encourage companies to create 
bioequivalent drugs—generics—that copy these branded drugs. Hatch-
Waxman granted brand-name manufacturers a period of patent 
restoration, which extended a covered drug’s patent length by up to 
five years (to a maximum of fourteen years) for half of the branded 
drug’s clinical testing period and all time spent securing FDA 
approval.16 It further conferred on branded drugs five years of brand 
exclusivity—that is, a prohibition against FDA approval of 
bioequivalent generic drugs for a limited window to ensure branded 
manufacturers an adequate opportunity to recoup research costs and 
 
12. See, e.g., Kerber-Walker, supra note 9. 
13. Mark McCamish, Effect of Naming on Competition and Innovation, 
SANDOZ BIOPHARMACEUTICALS,  6 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-
On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/mccamish.pdf. 
14. The term “generic biologic” is necessarily slightly imprecise; as 
mentioned above, a “generic,” properly understood, is chemically 
identical to its brand-name counterpart; biosimilars are simply highly 
functionally similar, with no clinically meaningful differences in potency 
or safety. 
15. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.). 
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012). 
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earn risk-adjusted profits.17 But in exchange for these new protections 
to brand-name manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman actively created 
incentives for generics to challenge brand-name patents, conferring a 
limited exclusivity period to the first generic challenger to a brand-
name drug.18 Critically for potential generic drugs, Hatch-Waxman 
created the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), a greatly 
truncated FDA approval process allowing a generic that demonstrates 
bioequivalence to rely on previously submitted brand-name safety and 
efficacy data.19  
Hatch-Waxman has successfully increased generic drug 
development without reducing branded drug innovation. By reducing 
both the time and cost for generic manufacturers seeking FDA 
approval, Hatch-Waxman produced a rush of generics to the market.20 
Whereas generics comprised only 19 percent of all prescriptions filled 
prior to 1984, generics now represent over 84 percent of prescriptions 
filled.21 This surge of cheaper generic products has produced 
significant savings for consumers; in the last decade alone, generic 
drugs have saved the health care system over $1 trillion dollars.22 
Hatch-Waxman did not, however, quash research and development in 
new drugs; in fact, drug development budgets have increased between 
threefold and sixfold since Hatch-Waxman was enacted.23  
 
17. Id. 
18. In order for a generic drug to receive FDA approval before patent 
expiration of the branded drug, the generic company must challenge the 
branded drug’s patent as invalid, rather than arguing that it was 
infringed by the generic drug or that it is unenforceable. Hatch-Waxman 
encourages generic companies to challenge patents by granting a 180-
day period of market exclusivity to the first generic company that 
challenges a patent and is either not sued by the branded manufacturer 
or prevails in the subsequent lawsuit. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., Guidance for Industry: 180-Day Generic Drug 
Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (June 1998), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm079342.pdf. 
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
20. Grabowski et al., supra note 11, at 512-13. 
21. Letter from John E. Dicken, Dir., Health Care, U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Office to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Committee on Finance 
(Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588064.pdf; IMS 
INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING MEDICINE USE AND 
COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN 
THE UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 15 (2013). 
22. Letter from John E. Dicken to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 21, at 4. 
23. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, 7 (2006), available at 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/
10-02-drugr-d.pdf. 
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Yet, because of the subtle distinction between bioequivalence and 
biosimilarity, Hatch-Waxman increased generic competition in the 
market for traditional drugs while failing to similarly encourage 
follow-on biologics development and distribution. Hatch-Waxman’s 
ANDA procedures applied only to bioequivalent drugs. Biosimilar 
drugs and follow-on biologics as a class required full, individual FDA 
testing and approval.24 This asymmetry rendered biologics broadly 
immune to the downward pricing pressures that affected traditional 
drugs in the decades following Hatch-Waxman.  
Though this asymmetry between traditional drugs and biologics 
persisted for several decades, Europe eventually led the way in 
developing science-driven regulatory regimes in approving biosimilars 
for consumer use.25 The European Commission established a 
biosimilars approval pathway in 2004.26 The Commission formally 
approved its first biosimilar drug—Omnitrope, a human growth 
hormone—in April 2006, following a positive scientific opinion from 
the European Medicines Agency (EMA).27 The EMA has subsequently 
extensively investigated numerous proposed biosimilar drugs. The 
European Union has approved nineteen biosimilar medicines for use in 
Europe thus far.28 The EMA has concluded that all of these medicines 
are “highly similar” to their biologic reference products, thus 
presenting no relevant differences for therapeutic use.29  
Europe’s faster biosimilar approval pathways have yielded 
substantial benefits to patients, including lower drug costs and wider 
biologic availability. One German study suggested European medical 
savings of over €33.4 billion ($45.5 billion) by 2020, with over €20.4 
 
24. See Kanter & Feldman, supra note 8, at 62-63. 
25. See, e.g, Andrzej Wiecek & Ashraf Mikhail, European Regulatory 
Guidelines for Biosimilars, 21 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 
v17, v17-18 (2006), available at 
http://ndt.oxfordjournals.org/content/21/suppl_5/v17.full.pdf. 
26. Biosimilars in the EU, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, 
http://www.gphaonline.org/gpha-media/gpha-resources/biosimilars-in-
the-eu (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
27. CRS FDA REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
28. European Public Assessment Reports, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, 
available at http://www.ema.europa.eu (click the “Find Medicine” tab; 
then click the “Human Medicines” tab; then click the “Browse by Type” 
tab; then select the “Biosimilars” button; then click the “Submit” 
button) (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
29. Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products, EUR. MED. 
AGENCY, at 6 (May 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_
guideline/2013/05/WC500142978.pdf. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to Entry 
146 
billion in savings from biosimilar antibody drugs alone.30 Another 
estimate calculates that the European approval process for biosimilars 
saves patients as much as 60 percent after four years of market 
penetration. Even conservative figures estimate cost savings of 20 to 
30 percent.31 A single drug recently approved for biosimilar use in 
Europe recorded sales of over $2 billion in 2012 alone.32 Other 
countries are following the European experience with biosimilars; for 
example, Canada has also approved the use of biosimilar drugs under 
some circumstances.33  
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), 
part of the ACA, attempted to update the American approval 
process.34 BPCIA provides an expedited biosimilars approval pathway 
that largely tracks Hatch-Waxman’s framework for traditional drugs, 
albeit with a few biologic-specific distinctions and some variance in 
exclusivity periods. Most significantly, a proposed biologic substitute 
does not have to demonstrate bioequivalence, but merely 
biosimilarity, to a reference product. In other words, the proposed 
biosimilar must show “no . . . meaningful differences . . . in terms of 
safety, purity, and potency.”35 This distinction rectifies Hatch-
Waxman’s failure with biosimilars by loosening the contextually 
impossible bioequivalence standard.  
Second, the BPCIA varies the exclusivity periods for biologics and 
biosimilars. Under the BPCIA, a product approved as biosimilar may 
further be deemed “interchangeable” with another biologic if its 
manufacturer can demonstrate that switching between the reference 
biologic and the proposed substitute presents no additional risk in 
safety or efficacy for consumers.36 Importantly, under Federal law, 
interchangeable products may be substituted for reference biologics 
 
30. Ben Hirschler, Analysis: Copycat Biotech Drugs Slow to Take off in 
Europe, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/us-biotech-copycats-
analysis-idUSBRE9B205I20131203. 
31. These figures vary substantially, but they are all significant. See 
generally Grabowski et al., supra note 11, at 543 (listing multiple 
estimates of biosimilars price discount evidence assuming robust 
pathway for biosimilars approval). 
32. Hirschler, supra note 30. 
33. Cole Werble, Canadian Biosimilar Approvals for Remicade: Time to 
Restart the Bus?, PHARMA & MED TECH BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 
27, 2014), http://www.elsevierbi.com/publications/rpm-report/first-
take/2014/1/canadian-biosimilar-approvals-for-remicade. 
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B). 
35. Id. (emphasis added). 
36. Id. § 262(i)(3). 
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without a prescribing doctor’s intervention.37 Innovative biologics—
the biologic equivalent of “brand-name” drugs—receive twelve years 
of data exclusivity38 under the BPCIA (including four years of market 
exclusivity), though the Obama Administration has recently called for 
reducing this to only seven years.39 Similar to Hatch-Waxman’s 180-
day generic exclusivity window, the first biosimilar deemed 
interchangeable receives a one-year “biosimilar exclusivity” approval 
as well.40 The BPCIA vests the FDA with broad discretion in 
determining biosimilarity: The FDA may rely on various studies or 
waive these requirements,41 make rules,42 issue guidance, or even 
categorically ban biosimilar applications for classes of biologics.43 
Although the FDA has yet to approve a biosimilar, the United 
States stands to benefit significantly from the BPCIA’s biosimilar 
approval pathway. In 2010, four of the top-ten selling drugs were 
biologics, and estimates indicate this will rise to seven of the top ten 
by 2016.44 Many of these biologics stand to soon go off-patent, 
opening the door for competition from cheaper biosimilars.45 As a 
result, industry estimates suggest that the biosimilar approval 
 
37. Id. 
38. “Data exclusivity” refers to the period during which a follow-on biologic, 
or biosimilar, is not permitted to use a reference drug’s safety 
information to file a truncated or expedited application for FDA 
approval. During the data exclusivity period, a proposed biosimilar must 
pay the costs—in time and capital—to secure FDA approval as though 
it were an original biologic. “Market exclusivity” is a minimum period 
during which the FDA is not permitted to approve any biosimilar (or 
generic) versions of a drug, granting that original biologic an effective 
monopoly regardless of developed biosimilars. See generally Vincent J. 
Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 249, 260-64 (2013). 
39. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, BUDGET 
OF THE U.S. GOV’T, FISCAL YEAR 2014 40, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/asse
ts/budget.pdf. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
40. Kanter & Feldman, supra note 8, at 76. 
41. See id. at 77. 
42. See id. 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(8)(E). 
44. Miller, supra note 6, at 3. 
45. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON 
BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-
health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-
commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf. 
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pathway established by the BPCIA could save U.S. consumers $250 
billion over the next decade.46  
Yet recent lobbying efforts, regulatory delays, and proposed state 
legislation threaten to obstruct the BPCIA-expedited pathway to 
inexpensive, powerful biosimilar drugs and to preserve a handful of 
biologic monopolies. This resistance has come in two forms. First, the 
FDA has resisted the spirit of the BPCIA through a number of 
biosimilar-hostile regulatory moves, often at the behest of several 
major drug manufacturers, despite the BPCIA’s clear legislative 
intent and structure imposing a Hatch-Waxman-style compromise 
between innovative biologics (roughly equivalent to brand-name 
traditional drugs) and biosimilars (roughly equivalent to generics). 
Equally problematic legislative proposals wend their way through a 
substantial fraction of state legislatures. Several states have already 
passed laws obstructing life-saving biosimilar drugs, and these state 
proposals share multiple BPCIA-thwarting traits in common. I next 
examine both of these obstacles to cheaper and more broadly 
available biosimilar drugs. 
II. Current Barriers to Biosimilar Entry 
Despite a prominent place in federal law, billions of dollars in 
potential savings, and an increasing trend toward international 
approval, pharmaceutical monopolists work to frustrate effective 
biosimilars adoption in the United States. As with efforts to obstruct 
generic drugs to maintain or enhance profits on brand-name 
pharmaceuticals, some biologics manufacturers have lobbied federal 
regulators, state legislatures, and even international organizations to 
prevent consumers from obtaining effective biosimilars.47 These legal 
maneuvers take many forms, from delaying approval of safe 
biosimilars to abrogating previous commitments to international drug-
naming protocols to circumventing Congressional intent for biosimilar 
substitution. I next outline these international, federal, and state 
efforts before turning to the legal and economic cases against these 
barriers to entry. 
A. FDA Resistance to a Biosimilars Pathway 
The FDA has proven surprisingly resistant to promoting 
biosimilars approval, despite the BPCIA’s mandate to the FDA to 
implement a framework balancing the interests of both biologics and 
biosimilars manufacturers. The BPCIA unequivocally expresses the 
ACA’s intention and sense “that a biosimilars pathway balancing 
 
46. Miller, supra note 6, at 7. 
47. See Pollack, supra note 3. 
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innovation and consumer interests should be established,”48 
commending this responsibility broadly to the FDA.49 The 
commissioner has admirably echoed these sentiments, stating that 
implementing an effective biosimilars pathway is “among [the FDA’s] 
highest priorities.”50 Yet the FDA’s 2012 draft guidelines, explaining 
their tentative approach towards a biosimilars pathway, leave several 
key areas unresolved, thus increasing uncertainty for biosimilars 
manufacturers and, ultimately, costs for consumers. The draft 
guidelines fail to provide any meaningful guidance as to what 
standards the agency will employ in determining whether a biosimilar 
is interchangeable with a biologic.51 Similarly, the draft guidelines do 
not establish—or even broadly cabin—the nature or extent of drug 
testing the FDA will require in comparing a proposed biosimilar and 
its reference biologic.52 The FDA does not expect to even finalize this 
draft until later this year at the earliest,53 while prominent industry 
lawsuits regarding the FDA’s biosimilars management could delay the 
FDA’s implementation of an approval pathway until as late as 2022.54 
But the FDA’s resistance to biosimilars exceeds merely passive 
resistance to biosimilar drugs or hesitation to proceed with a 
biosimilar applications pathway; indeed, the FDA is currently 
considering whether to adopt a different naming policy for biosimilars 
than the policy that has been in place for generic drugs for over fifty 
years.55  This new policy has the potential to both increase 
 
48. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
7001(b), 124 Stat. 804 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (k)(5)(B). 
50. Biosimilars, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, 
http://gpha.hfwebdev.com/issues/biosimilars (last visited Sept. 20, 
2014) (quoting the U.S. Food & Drug Comm’r Martha Hamburg in 
February 2012). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (k)(4) (2009) (enacted). 
52. Id. § 262 (k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa)-(cc). 
53. Mia Burns, Frost & Sullivan Breaks Down Biosimilars Market, 
DRUGS.COM (Oct. 2013), http://www.drugs.com/news/frost-sullivan-
breaks-down-biosimilars-market-48276.html (“The FDA has yet to 
finalize its guidelines . . . . Toscano said during [a] webinar that the 
final agency guidance is anticipated during 2014, with the first 
biosimilars being held in anticipation for some time in 2015.”). 
54. Stanton J. Lovenworth, The New Biosimilar Era: The Basics, the 
Landscape, and the Future, 6 LIFE SCI. L. & INDUS. REP. 972, 972 
(2012). 
55. AM. MED. ASS’N, Generic Naming: Who is USAN?, http://www.ama-
assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-science/united-states-
adopted-names-council/generic-drug-naming-explained.page (last visited 
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information costs for prescribers and pharmacists and to discredit the 
substitutability of biosimilar drugs. 
Both traditional drugs and biologics typically have two names: a 
brand name—often called a proprietary name—and a nonproprietary 
name. The nonproprietary name reflects certain characteristics of the 
drugs such as chemical structure or pharmacological properties.56 The 
FDA, working with the U.S. Adopted Names Council and the U.S. 
Pharmacopeial Convention, has the role of determining drugs’ 
nonproprietary names—the United States Adopted Name (USAN).57 
Outside of the United States, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
assigns drugs’ nonproprietary names—the International 
Nonproprietary Names (INN). Although the USAN and INN are 
independent of each other, the two groups work to ensure the USAN 
and INN are typically identical.58 As a result, products with the same 
active ingredients can be recognized globally by their nonproprietary 
name. 
But proponents of a new naming policy have worked to disrupt 
this naming convention. These groups assert that unique names are 
necessary to track any adverse events from biologics and biosimilars.59 
These groups point to a study of traditional drugs that found that 
generics and branded products under the same INN sometimes suffer 
misattributions of adverse events.60 Consequently, the WHO and FDA 
are reconsidering the naming of biosimilars. Potential new policies 
range from minor deviations, such as adding a prefix or a biosimilars 
identifier to existing names, to completely different INNs/USANs for 
biosimilars.61 
 
Sept. 9, 2014) (noting that the current naming policy was developed in 
the 1960s). 
56. FTC Follow-on Biologics Workshop, supra note 1, at 68844. 
57. Id. 
58. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO Informal Consultation on International 
Nonproprietary Names (INN) Policy for Biosimilar Products 5 
(Programme on Int’l Nonproprietary Names, Working Document 
07.211), available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/services/inn/BiosimilarsINN_Report.pdf
?ua=1. 
59. See Mari Serebrov, WHO: Biosimilars Not the Same, Why Should 
Names Be?, BIOWORLD TODAY (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://www.bioworld.com/content/who-biosimilars-not-same-why-
should-names-be-0. 
60. See ERIKA LEITZAN ET AL., THE FOOD & DRUG L. INST., BIOSIMILAR 
NAMING: HOW DO ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING DATA SUPPORT THE 
NEED FOR DISTINCT NONPROPRIETARY NAMES FOR BIOSIMILARS 3 
(2013), http://www.fdli.org/docs/members-only/lietzan-faers-bio-final-3-
27-13.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
61. See Serebrov, supra note 59. 
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Critics of this potential policy change point to several other pieces 
of evidence showing that unique nonproprietary names are not 
necessary to accurately track adverse events. Rather than relying on 
data from traditional non-biological drugs, they point to evidence 
from adverse event reporting for actual biologic drugs, demonstrating 
that biologic products are almost universally identified by their 
unique proprietary name, not the INN that they share with other 
drugs.62 Additionally, they explain that existing technology for 
adverse event reporting renders unique nonproprietary names 
unnecessary for safety reporting. In fact, current pharmacy technology 
enables manufacturers and regulators to track pharmaceuticals down 
to a specific batch.63 Thus, changing this time-tested naming 
convention will add negligible or no safety benefits. 
Moreover, by virtue of biologics’ inherent complexity, no two 
batches of biologics are identical; even consecutive batches of a 
biological drug from the same manufacturer are not identical.64 These 
natural variations undercut any theoretical justification for a different 
biosimilar nonproprietary name, as these biosimilars merely 
demonstrate slight variations not unlike differences between original 
biologics batches. Furthermore, every approved biosimilar necessarily 
has been shown to have no meaningful differences from its reference 
drug, obviating the need for a distinct nonproprietary name entirely. 
Instead of providing safety benefits, changes to the nomenclature 
for biosimilars would necessarily impede consumer access to these 
drugs in several ways. The most direct is in basic information costs to 
healthcare professionals and pharmacists: the current policy of 
assigning nonproprietary names focuses on active ingredients, 
developing a terminology consistent for therapeutic rather than 
 
62. See McCamish, supra note 13, at 13 (reporting adverse event data for 
the Sandoz biologic products: Binocrit, Abseamed, Epoetin Alfa Hexal, 
Omnitrope, Zarzio); Sumant Ramachandra, Senior V.P., Chief Scientific 
Officer, Hospira Inc., Presentation for FTC Biosimilars Workshop on 
Naming Proposals and Impact on Competition, 7 (Feb. 4, 2014), 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%
20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislativ
e%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition
/ramachandra.pdf (reporting adverse event data for the Hospira biologic 
products, Retacrit and Nivestim). 
63. Bruce Leicher, Anti-Competitive Deterrents to Investment and 
Innovation in Biosimilars and Interchangeable Biologics, MOMENTA, 24 
(Feb. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-
On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/leicher.pdf; Miller, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
64. McCamish, supra note 13, at 6-8. 
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business, purposes. Departing from this naming uniformity would 
partially obscure which biologics were approved for similar uses.65 It 
would also perniciously suggest—contrary to the BPCIA’s very 
definition of biosimilarity—that biosimilar drugs differed in clinically 
meaningful ways from their corresponding original biologics.66 But 
perhaps more unhelpfully, a naming change would undoubtedly 
encourage a messaging campaign to discourage biosimilars parallel to 
the long-since-discredited attempts by brand-name pharmaceuticals to 
discourage consumers from generic traditional drugs. Neither of these 
results is consistent with the BPCIA’s delegation to the FDA to 
establish a cost-effective, sensible pathway to biosimilars approval. 
B. Anti-Biosimilars Lobbying in the States 
Encouraged by some success in resisting the BPCIA at the federal 
level, opponents of biosimilars have proposed bills in numerous state 
legislatures designed to impede the prescription of approved 
biosimilars in place of innovative biologics.67 While most states that 
have considered these laws have rejected them, a handful of states 
such as North Dakota, Florida, Utah, Virginia, and Oregon have 
passed laws restricting biosimilars,68 and similar legislation continues 
to be considered in numerous other states.69 These laws seek to impose 
dubious patient consent, recordkeeping, and physician notification 
requirements to discourage healthcare professionals and consumers 
from dispensing or consuming biosimilars. 
Biosimilar-restrictive legislation typically relies on three 
interlocking mechanisms: (1) a notification and recordkeeping 
requirement for the prescribing physician of any biosimilar; (2) a 
patient’s veto or patient notification requirement, or both; and (3) a 
set of burdensome recordkeeping (or labeling) provisions for 
pharmacists.70 These three interlocking mechanisms collectively 
 
65. E.g., Lovenworth, supra note 54, at 9. 
66. FTC Follow-On Biologics Workshop, supra note 1, at 68844. 
67. See Pollack, supra note 3. 
68. Michelle Derbyshire, U.S. State Legislation on Biosimilars Substitution, 
2 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 155 (2013), available at 
http://gabi-journal.net/us-state-legislation-on-biosimilars-
substitution.html. 
69. Jessica S. Mazer, Assistant Vice President, State Affairs, PCMA, 
Introduction to State Biosimilar Substitution Laws, 3 (Feb. 4, 2014), 
available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/Follow-
On%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legis
lative%20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Compet
ition/mazer.pdf. 
70. See, e.g., S. 2190, 63rd Leg. § 1(1)(a)-(e) (N.D. 2013); H.B. 365, 102d 
Leg., §2(2)((a)-(d)) (Fla. 2013). 
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attempt to circumvent Congress’s determination through the BPCIA 
that interchangeable biologics can be substituted without a doctor’s 
intervention. These state laws not only allow physician interference 
with an FDA-approved substitute, but actively promote interference 
through unnecessary notification and recordkeeping requirements.  
The physician notification provisions contained in the state 
legislation require pharmacists to notify prescribers upon dispensing 
an interchangeable biosimilar.71 These provisions increase burdensome 
and often duplicative notifications by and to healthcare professionals, 
and the provisions also deter physicians from substituting biosimilars 
for original biologics. The notification requirement delivers a message 
to physicians that biosimilars are different, or even suspect, thus 
raising fears among physicians that they could be exposed to 
malpractice claims based on substitution.72 The physician notification 
provisions, however, directly contradict the BPCIA’s conspicuous 
absence of a physician notification for substitution of biosimilars, 
much less interchangeable biosimilars. The absence of such a 
requirement in the BPCIA is understandable: the BPCIA’s definition 
of biosimilarity—that is, requiring the absence of meaningful clinical 
differences in safety and potency—precludes the vast majority of 
medical distinctions between original biologics and biosimilar drugs. 
Moreover, these requirements, when applied to interchangeable 
biosimilars as anti-biosimilar laws contemplate, are even more 
pointless because no meaningful distinctions exist between original 
biologics and interchangeable biosimilars. 
Patient veto and patient notification provisions act similarly by 
requiring a pharmacist to notify a patient of a biosimilar 
substitution,73 and in some cases, by allowing the patient the right to 
refuse the biosimilar product selected by the pharmacist.74  These 
provisions raise fears in patients that they are receiving a different or 
inferior product that warrants advance notification.75 Also, if given 
the ability to veto a biosimilar substitution, patients may opt for the 
brand-name biologic that has advertised heavily, even when this 
option would increase patient and payer costs without any resulting 
medical benefits. 
Finally, anti-biosimilar laws generally impose lengthy 
recordkeeping provisions on pharmacists. These require pharmacists 
 
71. S.B. 2190, 63rd Leg. (N.D. 2013); Fla. H.B. 365; S.B. 460, 77th Leg. (Or. 
2013); S.B. 78, 60th Leg. (Utah 2013); S.B. 1285, 63rd Leg. (Va. 2013), 
H.B. 1422, 63rd Leg. (Va. 2013). 
72. Leicher, supra note 59, at 7. 
73. N.D. S.B. 2190; Fla. H.B. 365; Or. S.B. 460; Utah S.B. 78; Va. S.B. 
1285, Va. H.B. 1422. 
74. N.D. S.B. 2190. 
75. Mazer, supra note 69, at 4. 
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to keep records, typically for three to five years, of all biosimilar 
substitutions made for all patients.76 Pharmacists must of course 
maintain these superfluous, and often duplicative, records consistent 
with extensive and costly federal regulations protecting sensitive 
medical data.77 By imposing these burdensome requirements every 
time a pharmacist substitutes a biosimilar, recordkeeping provisions 
deter biosimilar substitution. The recordkeeping requirements also 
suggest to pharmacists that biosimilars’ efficacy and safety is 
uncertain, warranting extensive recordkeeping requirements. 
Proponents argue that these regulations are necessary to prevent 
the immunogenic reactions, adverse side effects, and diminished 
effectiveness that could result from nonequivalent biosimilar 
substitution.78 However, these concerns are unwarranted when 
examined in light of experiences regarding biosimilars; the European 
Union, for example, has maintained a biosimilars approval pathway 
for almost a decade, with a similar safety record as original biologics, 
billions of Euros in patient savings, and broadly increased patient 
access to biologics.79 
State anti-biosimilars laws have broadly failed thus far. While five 
states have passed anti-biosimilars laws,80 several of the most 
populous states have rejected anti-biosimilars laws, including 
California, Illinois, and Texas.81 Of the sixteen states that have 
contemplated anti-biosimilars measures, more than two-thirds—eleven 
in total—have rejected these laws.82 Nevertheless, several states  
76. Florida’s enacted legislation only requires keeping records for two years. 
Derbyshire, supra note 68, at 156. 
77. Id. at 155. 
78. BIO Principles on Patient Safety in the Substitution of Biologic 
Products, BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG. (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/bio-principles-patient-safety-
substitution-biologic-products. 
79. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Stimulating Innovation in the Biologics Industry: 
A Balanced Approach to Marketing Exclusivity, TEVA USA GOV’T AFF. 
3 nn.7 & 8 (2008), 
http://people.bu.edu/kotlikoff/New%20Kotlikoff%20Web%20Page/Kotli
koff_Innovation_in_Biologics21.pdf. 
80. Derbyshire, supra note 68, at 155. 
81. Kurt R. Karst, Biosimilars State Legislation Score Card, FDA LAW 
BLOG (Sep. 4, 2013), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/bio
similars-state-legislation-scorecard.html. 
82. Id.; Cameron Lockwood, State Biosimilars Legislation in the U.S.: What 
the Situation in California Reveals About the Nuances of the 
“Substitution” Debate, IHS HEALTHCARE & PHARMA BLOG (Sept. 3, 
2013), http://healthcare.blogs.ihs.com/2013/09/03/state-biosimilars-
legislation-in-the-us-what-the-situation-in-california-reveals-about-the-
nuances-of-the-substitution-debate/. 
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continue to consider anti-biosimilars legislation.83 As I explain below, 
anti-biosimilar legislation potentially carries grave consequences for 
both patient health and consumer welfare. 
III. Consequences from Barriers to Biosimilars 
The BPCIA attempts to balance the interests of original biologics 
manufacturers in protecting research investments and earning profits 
with the interests of both biosimilars manufacturers and consumers in 
wider drug access at lower costs. Some federal and state regulatory 
proposals act directly contrary to this mandate, seeking to maintain 
or even extend original biologics manufacturers’ effective monopolies 
over their biologics. Others merely attempt to defeat the BPCIA’s 
compromise by discouraging physicians, pharmacists, or consumers 
from prescribing, providing, or using safe biosimilars. Both attempts 
frustrate the BPCIA’s critical function under the ACA’s twin goals: 
medical cost containment and expanded affordable medical coverage. I 
next discuss these anti-biosimilars policies’ troubling implications. As 
I explain, these impediments reduce competition in the market for 
biologic drugs, impede drug innovation, increase drug costs, and limit 
patient access to these important medications. 
A. Threats to Competition and Innovation 
Proposals to block biosimilars from expedited FDA approval 
effectively bar entry to biologics markets, thus extending an already 
lengthy monopoly period for original biologics manufacturers. This 
extension needlessly locks potential rival firms out of biologics 
markets by raising costs to bring biosimilars to market. These 
increased costs deter potential entrants, reducing competition; this 
reduction in competition decreases innovation, encourages monopoly 
pricing, and ultimately increases prices to consumers. Consumers pay 
twice for these barriers to entry through more expensive drugs and 
reduced access to effective, potentially life-saving, medications. 
Barriers to entry include any legal, economic, or practical 
limitations that prevent firms from offering products in a given 
market; these barriers necessarily increase the likelihood a firm will 
obtain a monopoly and charge monopoly prices.84 In the purest sense, 
 
83. Mazer, supra note 69, at 3-4. 
84. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-117 (1956). See 
also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). 
Stigler defines a barrier to entry as any cost to producing a product 
borne only by firms seeking to enter an industry rather than firms 
already in it. For example, regulatory costs required to clear an already-
established biologic are already sunk by original biologics manufacturers, 
which can be recouped during an original biologic’s exclusivity period. 
However, without a workable FDA biosimilars pathway, a new 
biosimilar manufacturer must pay these costs anew—likely without 
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these are costs that would be borne by firms not currently serving a 
market, but that are not currently felt by firms in the market; in 
other words, costs that only affect outsiders looking in on a market.85 
Some barriers to entry are economic; for example, economies of scale 
are cost advantages that firms gain only by obtaining a certain size or 
market share. Firms outside a market necessarily lack these 
advantages by virtue of having no market share, so these cost 
advantages act as a barrier to entry.86 Some barriers to entry are 
purely legal, such as data and market exclusivity periods (included in 
part in both Hatch-Waxman and the BPCIA) which formally prevent 
outside firms from offering competing products.87 
The BPCIA and Hatch-Waxman represent a compromise on 
barriers to entry between original drug manufacturers and subsequent 
potential entrants, balancing entry concerns by permitting some 
barriers while reducing others. Original drug manufacturers claim—
with some support—that the high research and development costs 
necessary to produce successful pharmaceuticals effectively require 
extensive monopoly profits merely to recoup their investments.88 
Subsequent drug manufacturers, seeking profits and original 
manufacturers’ market share, can safely and more affordably 
reproduce these expensive drugs, thus reducing the opportunity of 
original manufacturers to recoup costs (or amass profits) while 
passing savings on to consumers. Each side claims its position will 
increase innovation; original manufacturers contend that an extensive 
monopoly period is the only way to allow for research into new and 
often unproductive drugs, while subsequent manufacturers point out 
that competitive markets tend to spur innovation as subsequent firms 
jostle for market share and original manufactures continue to 
 
therapeutic benefit—to compete with an original biologic. FDA licensing 
provisions are therefore one class of barrier to entry, which state 
regulators seek to enhance. 
85. STIGLER, supra note 84, at 67-70. 
86. See Joe S. Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition 
of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 15, 
15-39 (1954). 
87. See generally US Biosimilars Law May Prove a Barrier to Entry for 
Biosimilars, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/US-biosimilars-law-may-
prove-a-barrier-to-entry-for-biosimilars. 
88. Id. See also Henry Grabowski & Joseph DiMasi, Biosimilars, Data 
Exclusivity, and the Incentives for Innovation: A Critique of Kotlikoff’s 
White Paper 9 (Duke Univ. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 2009-02, 
Feb. 2009), available at 
http://public.econ.duke.edu/Papers//PDF/FinalDraft2_5_09.pdf. 
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innovate to stay ahead of the pack.89 The BPCIA and Hatch-Waxman 
offer a compromise between these two competing positions by 
granting an extensive exclusivity period to original manufacturers in 
order to allow for both substantial cost recoupment and profits, while 
at the same time reducing the onerous barriers to entry that the 
FDA’s new drug approval pathway imposes.90 
Indeed, evidence indicates that Hatch-Waxman spurred 
innovation and greatly increased competition in the market for 
traditional drugs. Since Hatch-Waxman was enacted in 1984, more 
than eight thousand generic drugs have been approved by the FDA.91  
Where generics represented only 19 percent of all drugs dispensed 
prior to 1984, they now represent over 84 percent.92 Moreover, while 
spurring innovation in generic drugs by facilitating their earlier 
market entry, Hatch-Waxman continued to protect the patent rights 
of branded drug manufacturers, thus encouraging innovation among 
these manufacturers as well. Research and development budgets have 
continued to rise among brand-name drug manufacturers.93 Similar to 
Hatch-Waxman’s effect on innovation, the BPCIA would also be 
expected to spur innovation and competition in the market for 
biologic drugs. The European Union, which has had an established 
regulatory pathway for biosimilars for a decade, has seen a significant 
degree of competition in the market for biologic drugs.94  
But the regulatory proposals discussed above each threaten to 
upset the BPCIA’s legislative balance because each introduces an 
additional, unproductive barrier to entry. Disrupting a half-century-
long convention in nonproprietary naming will raise information costs 
on consumers, physicians, and pharmacists, deterring biosimilars 
 
89. Grabowski & DiMasi, supra note 88, at 9. See also Kotlikoff, supra note 
79. 
90. Grabowski & DiMasi, supra note 88, at 9. 
91. Fact Sheet: New “Biosimilars” User Fees Will Enhance Americans’ 
Access to Alternatives to Biologic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(July 16, 2012), 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDr
ugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/FDA
SIA/ucm311121.htm. 
92. Letter from John E. Dicken to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, supra note 21, at 2; 
IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, supra note 21, at 15. 
93. See generally PHRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2011 PROFILE (2011) 
available at 
http://report.nih.gov/investigators_and_trainees/acd_bwf/pdf/Phrma
_Industry_Profile_2011.pdf. 
94. What You Need to Know About Biosimilar Medicinal Products, EUR. 
COMM’N 15-16, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/biosimilars
_report_en.pdf. 
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prescription and use even when medically appropriate. Varying 
nonproprietary names will imply none-too-subtly that biosimilar 
medications are clinically different, despite the BPCIA’s stern 
mandate that all biosimilars must contain no clinically meaningful 
difference from corresponding original biologics. Notification and 
recordkeeping provisions similarly send a message that the safety or 
efficacy of biosimilars is not clear, leading to uncertainty and 
unwarranted fears. These state-level requirements also raise 
transaction costs on medical professionals, making healthcare more 
expensive to no one’s benefit, save for a handful of pharmaceutical 
monopolists. Both policies will raise barriers to entry, harming 
consumers.  
Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that anti-biosimilars policies 
will stifle competition, raising prices and limiting consumer access to 
life-saving medications. Data from Australia, Japan, and Europe 
indicates that varying nonproprietary names reduces biosimilars’ 
market presence, thus restricting competition in the market for 
biologics.95 Varying U.S. nonproprietary names would likely have the 
same anticompetitive effect. Similarly, empirical evidence 
demonstrates how state-level laws burdening biosimilars 
substitutability would harm consumers: States that required 
notification, recordkeeping, and consent to substitution for generic 
drugs saw significantly less generic drug usage.96 These provisions—by 
design—stifled competition and innovation in traditional drug 
markets.97 Policymakers should not repeat this unfortunate mistake. It 
is clear that these proposed policies will merely reduce competition 
and innovation in biologics markets. As I discuss next, this economic 
harm will translate directly into patient harm, violating the BPCIA’s 
goals of increasing healthcare availability while controlling healthcare 
costs.  
B. Higher Consumer Prices and Reduced Patient Access 
These barriers to entry through the international, national, and 
state attempts to prevent consumers from receiving life-saving 
biosimilars drugs will harm consumers. Restricting competition in the 
market for biologic drugs will necessarily keep the prices for biological 
drugs out of reach for many consumers. A principle as old as markets 
 
95. See McCamish, supra note 13, at 15-16 (reporting on IMS health data 
from 2012); Ramachandra, supra note 62, at 8. 
96. William H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower 
Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1383 (2010); 
Norman V. Carroll et al., The Effects of Differences in State Drug 
Product Selection Laws on Pharmacists’ Substitution Behavior, 25 MED. 
CARE 1069, 1074 (1987). 
97. See Shrank et al., supra note 96. 
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themselves demonstrates why: The less competition in a market, the 
higher prices will be.98 
Biologic drugs are currently prohibitively expensive for many 
consumers. The average cost of a biologic drug is twenty-two times 
greater than a traditional drug.99 The average annual cost of a 
biologic drug is estimated to be $34,550,100 but annual costs for many 
drugs exceed $200,000.101 Moreover, by requiring large patient 
coinsurance for specialty drugs, such as biologics, most prescription 
drug insurance plans fail to fully defray these massive costs.102 As a 
result, many consumers cannot afford to obtain these life-saving 
drugs. 
In contrast, increasing competition in the market for biologic 
drugs will necessarily cause prices to decrease, allowing more patients 
access to these treatments. There is substantial room for competition 
to reduce prices as manufacturers of branded biologics currently reap 
substantial monopoly profits. The average gross margin for these 
drugs is close to 98 percent; that is, manufacturers retain 
approximately 98 percent of their revenues after they pay the cost of 
manufacturing the biologics.103 Current barriers to entry already result 
in this 98 percent margin for pharmaceutical monopolists; preserving 
barriers through either regulatory inaction or state legislation will 
merely extend original manufacturers’ monopoly power, thus 
maintaining high prices while reducing biologics’ availability to 
patients.  
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(2013). 
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available at 
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available at 
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Both domestic and international evidence demonstrates how 
increased competition from biosimilars will reduce prices in the 
market for biologic drugs.  Since Hatch-Waxman was enacted in 1984, 
competition between generics and brand-name pharmaceuticals in 
traditional drug markets has saved consumers over $1 trillion.104 
Consumers saved $157 billion through generics competition in 2010 
alone.105 As the FTC has concluded, “Overall, generic drug 
competition has substantially reduced many prescription drug prices 
and total prescription drug expenditures, and increased access to 
therapeutic drugs for more Americans.”106 Similarly, evidence from 
Europe reveals that biosimilars have stimulated market competition, 
reducing prices and increasing access to life-saving drugs. Data 
indicates that biosimilars in the European Union will save consumers 
between $15 billion and $45 billion from 2007 to 2020.107  These lower 
prices significantly improve patient access to these important drugs; 
biosimilar entry has increased the volume of biologic drugs dispensed 
by approximately 50 percent.108 Potential American savings dwarf 
those in Europe; indeed, industry estimates suggest that U.S. 
consumers could save over $250 billion in the next decade from 
biosimilar competition for just eleven biologic drugs.109 These cost 
savings will allow countless more patients the ability to access these 
life-saving drugs. 
Considered fully, impeding biosimilars unjustifiably increases 
healthcare costs while decreasing availability of powerful drugs. 
Policies attempting to bar biosimilars from consumers—whether in 
the guise of a new naming convention, state regulations encouraging 
physician confusion or patient hesitation, or simply increasing 
recordkeeping costs—harm patients in favor of helping monopolists. 
These barriers to entry should be rejected because they hurt 
consumers and upset the BPCIA’s thoughtful compromise.  
Conclusion 
Biologics are at the forefront of American medicine, promising 
treatments and even cures for previously intractable diseases. These 
drugs represent a vital and growing share of the American 
pharmaceutical sector. But the cost of these drugs puts them beyond 
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the reach of most patients. Biosimilars appear to be a partial remedy 
to this complicated problem, offering lower-cost, powerful therapeutic 
benefits to patients who might respond to tested and known biologics. 
The BPCIA, sensibly examining analogous Hatch-Waxman’s 
successes in the market for traditional drugs, imports a familiar and 
successful compromise between biologics manufacturers’ desire for a 
limited monopoly to incentivize innovation and consumers’ need for 
broad access to biotherapies. The BPCIA gives original biologics’ 
manufacturers a lengthy exclusivity period, while still encouraging 
potential biosimilar manufacturers to create innovative and similar 
drugs through a faster approval process and the promise of 
substitutability for interchangeable biosimilars. This compromise 
mirrors the successful integration of name-brand and generic 
traditional pharmaceuticals, drastically reducing costs and increasing 
drug availability. If properly implemented, the BPCIA promises to 
similarly expand access to biologic medications. 
But federal and state regulators have recently attempted, with 
some limited success, to impede the BPCIA’s biosimilars 
implementation pathway; these obstacles merely hurt consumers, 
specifically patients, for the benefit of a few patent-holders. Policies 
such as a different nonproprietary naming system for biosimilars or 
state regulations that burden the substitution of interchangeable 
biologics required under the BPCIA offer no gains in patient safety or 
efficacy and muddle a uniform national program. These obstacles 
instead impose costly barriers to entry to potential biosimilar 
manufacturers, thereby lengthening original biologics manufacturers’ 
effective monopoly periods, inhibiting innovation in potential 
biosimilars, increasing drug costs, and reducing access to the most 
effective available medications. Consumers will benefit tremendously 
through increased innovation, lower prices, and broader access to 
these drugs if only federal regulators and state legislators will allow it. 
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